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TRANSGENDER BATHROOM USAGE: A PRIVILEGING
OF BIOLOGY AND PHYSICAL DIFFERENCE IN THE LAW
BY JILL D. WEINBERG*
When Steven began teaching, he was diagnosed with
Gender Identity Disorder1 (GID) and began transitioning from
a male to a female. This process lasted from August 2000 until
June 2003. During this time, Steven legally changed her name
to Rebecca, presented as a female at work, and changed the sex
designation on her driver's license to reflect her female
identity.
She had a number of cosmetic surgeries and
ultimately, had sex reassignment surgery. This transformation
never bothered the college until fall 2001 when students
complained that a man was using the women's restroom. The
college indicated that students expressed concerns regarding
their privacy and/or safety and that the college had "a
compelling interest in protecting privacy rights of other
individuals . . . by maintaining the sex-segregation of the

restrooms." 2 The college informed Rebecca that she could not
use the women's restroom until she provided proof that she had
sex reassignment surgery.
Rebecca's story is not uncommon for transgender
employees. One reason for such discomfort over transgender
bathroom usage is the result of a legal and social landscape
that has adopted a "separate spheres" ideology, 3 in which the
construction of sex segregated bathrooms and preoccupation
with anatomical difference remain unchallenged. By this
*PhD (student), Northwestern University; M.A., The University of Chicago;
J.D., Seattle University School of Law.
1 The medical diagnosis refers to an individual who has a strong and
persistent belief of having been born into the wrong body and a desire to live
or be treated as the other sex.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, TEXT REVISION §

302.9 (4th ed. 1994).
v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ. 021531 PHXSRB, 2006
WL 820955 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment).
3 See Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture
& Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5-6 (2007).
2 Kastl

148

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XVIII

account, to permit a transgender person - one who crosses the
gender binary - to choose a particular restroom would
challenge one of the few structures that permits sexual
distinction and confront the deference to biology when gender
should govern. In other words, the uneasiness associated with
transgender bathroom usage highlights a legal resistance to
the gender usage and by extension, a gender-driven
jurisprudence.
This essay compares transgender bathroom usage to the
varying histories of segregation, accommodation, and
In this theoretical project, I argue that
integration.
transgender bathroom usage highlights the resistance to
gender jurisprudence and the law's continued (and undue)
emphasis on biology. Even though the comparison between
race and gender bathroom segregation is not a novel
exploration, 4 the comparison between disability and gender has
not been made.
The closer examination of this issue looks at the efficacy
of current antidiscrimination legislation that would provide
"employment protections" for transgender
individuals.
Currently, both houses of Congress have introduced a
transgender-inclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA),5 yet the bills do not include provisions regarding
bathroom usage, nor do they impose a burden on employers to
make bathroom accommodations for transgender employees.
In effect, such legislation permits employers to impose
restrictions on bathroom usage and to discriminate against
transgender employees without the risk of liability.
The broader analysis revisits "potty parity" and what we
can learn from the biological justification for segregating
I argue that although biological division of
bathrooms.
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Wassertrom, Race, Sex and Preferential Treatment: An
Approach to the Topics, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 552-53 (Robert E. Goodwin & Philip Pettit eds., 2d ed. Blackwell
Pubrg 2006) (1997) ("i[t is wrong, clearly racist, to have racially separate
bathrooms.... [But there is] no common conception that it is wrong, clearly
sexist, to have sexually segregated ones.").
5 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong.
(2009); The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th
Cong. (2009).
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bathrooms has been somewhat fluid,6 the current construction
of bathroom segregation privileges certain groups of legally
protected minorities (race and disability) over sex, gender, and
gender identity. Not only is sex segregation inconsistent with a
legal landscape that advocates for integration and
accommodation, but it also reinforces the unwillingness to
adopt gender jurisprudence.
I. THE EFFICACY OF ENDA AND THE CREATION OF THE
"BATHROOM EXCUSE"

An analysis of transgender bathroom usage through the
lens of employment discrimination cases shows that many
workplace controversies involve an employer imposing
unreasonable demands on a transgender. The cases suggest
that employers impose unreasonable medical documentation
requirements so as to preclude a fair number of transgender
individuals from using the bathroom of their choosing.
Although the passage of a gender identity inclusive ENDA
would mark a significant victory for transgender employees,
there remains a number of concerns Congress has not
addressed. Specifically, Congress should provide appropriate
restroom accommodations for those who are transitioning or
have transitioned (whether or not one had gender
reassignment surgery).
The exclusion of bathroom provisions in ENDA permits
employers to defer to bathroom accommodation as a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason to terminate an employee. For
example, in Johnson v. Fresh Mark, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
that the employer's basis for firing Selena Johnson, a male-tofemale transgender, was appropriate because of complaints
that a male was using the women's restroom. 7 The Tenth
Circuit in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority concluded that a
male-to-female transsexual bus driver's termination was not
based on gender identity, but because of the driver's expressed
intent to use the women's public restrooms, which could result

6 See infra note 9.
7 98 Fed. App'x. 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
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in liability.8 Cases such as Johnson and Etsitty suggest that an
antidiscrimination law that does not capture all the dimensions
of discriminatory conduct truly undermines the legislation
altogether.
By allowing employers to use a "bathroom excuse," so to
speak, the law creates several medical obstacles to permitting a
person to use a particular restroom. First, an individual who
wishes to have gender reassignment surgery must undergo a
lengthy process of hormone therapy and presentation as the
opposite gender before a doctor considers performing the
Consequently, such individuals cannot provide
surgery. 9
medical documentation during this interim period and
therefore, are forced to present as one gender, but use the
bathroom of the opposite gender. 10 Second, the cost and health
risks associated with gender reassignment surgery may cause
transgender individuals to refrain from the procedure. To
make surgery the gate-keeping function for particular
bathroom usage forces those who are transgendered, but
cannot afford or choose not to have the surgery to use the
bathroom of the gender opposite from the gender in which he or
she is publically presenting him or herself.
These unfair and unreasonable outcomes can be
ameliorated by including language in ENDA that permits
transgender individuals to choose the bathroom of their
transitioning gender. This may prove to be the single best way
for giving the adequate legal coverage for transgender
employees, acknowledging that bathroom usage - like uniform
F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
9 The one-year period of gender presentation is called the Real-Life
Experience (RLE). This typically succeeds the two years of counseling and
hormone therapy and precedes gender reassignment surgery. THE HARRY
8 502

BENJAMIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS, SIXTH VERSION, at 17 (2001), available

at http://wpath.org/Documents2/socv6.pdf.
10 Interestingly, this peculiar scenario would necessarily create more
workplace disruption and tension between the transgender employee, his coworkers, and customers. A transgender person who transitioned, but did not
have the gender reassignment surgery would be using a bathroom of one
gender, but presenting as the other gender. For example, a male-to-female
transgender would be forced to use the men's room even though she
physically presents and considers herself to be a female.
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or other transition provisions - should be protected under
ENDA. Although some employers may object to the prospect of
either (1) having co-workers or customer complaints over
sharing a bathroom with a transgender or (2) constructing
separate bathroom facilities for a single employee, these
concerns pale to the notion that an individual can continue to
be legitimately fired for simply using a bathroom of the gender
to which they identify. With respect to the former, the
discomfort of others has been a dispositive issue in other
contexts, so to make transgender bathroom usage an issue is
legally inconsistent. To that end, it is unlikely that whites
were comfortable sharing a restroom with an African-American
the day after Jim Crow laws were repealed. With respect to
the latter, even though ENDA does not mandate the
construction of separate facilities to accommodate transgender
employees, it does beg the question of why the law mandates
bathroom accommodation for disabled people, but not
transgender individuals.

II. TRANSGENDER BATHROOM USAGE AND A LESSON IN
GENDER BIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE
An examination of bathroom segregation on the basis of
race, disability, and transgender status suggests there is an
inconsistent application of biology used to a structural division
of restrooms. Specifically, the exclusion of bathroom usage
highlights a pervasive problem with jurisprudence, namely, the
undue reliance of anatomy in policy-making, a concern scholars
have expressed considerably over the law's preoccupation with
sex over gender.
Jim Crow laws are the often-cited example for the
unjustifiable separation of public facilities. The evisceration of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 prompted states to enact racial
segregation legislation to subordinate and separate AfricanAmericans from public space such as restrooms. When de jure
segregation was no longer constitutional' and facilities were
forced to become integrated, there was no public protestation

11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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over the integration of bathroom facilities between blacks and
whites.

Although religious rights organizations have mocked
the comparison between Jim Crow laws to transgender
have thought
bathroom usage, 12 legal commentators
otherwise. 13 Patricia Williams, for example, compared the
relegation of a university transgender student to a unisex
bathroom to race discrimination. 14 She argued that instead of
giving the student the right to choose - a mantra we associate
in many circumstances involving our bodies (e.g., abortion,
birth control, or right to die) - the student had "to invert, to
stretch, meaning rather than oneself... [and] became a mere
floating signifier."' 5 In essence, the relegation of a transgender
individual to a bathroom is akin to forcing blacks to a separate
restroom facility.
Furthermore, although society may view race and
gender differences as different cases, the rhetoric of anatomy
and power have been employed for both groups. To this end,
racial segregation of bathrooms was justified (bizarrely, but
16
apparently with a straight face) to prevent "contamination."'
The biological justifications ultimately manifested in the form
of a social and legal system of racial oppression during slavery
17
through the Jim Crow era.
The adoption of racial de jure segregation created a legal
system in which race became the symbol of subordination and
disparity, while other forms of biological difference were viewed
as epiphenomenal. This becomes apparent through Elizabeth
Abel's pivotal work in which an analysis of the visual imagery
12

See, e.g., Transgender 'Peeing in Peace' Paper Equates Male-Female

Restrooms with Jim Crow Laws, AMERICANS FOR TRUTH ABOUT
HOMOsExuALITY, April 22, 2008, http://americansfortruth.com/news/peeing-in-

peace-paper-equates-male-female-restrooms-with-jim-crow-laws.html.
13 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Cover Blindness, 88 CAL. L. REV. 65, 68 (2000)
("Why were the racially segregated bathrooms of Jim Crow so clearly
invidious, while bathrooms segregated by sex equally clearly are not?").
14 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 122-24 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1991).
15 Id.

at 123.
E.g., Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance, The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow
Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505, 514 (2006).
17 Wassertrom, supra note 4, at 553.
16
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and propaganda during the Jim Crow era featured bathrooms
and drinking fountains and highlighted race, not gender,
difference.' 8 She suggested "race not sex is the dyad that
founds the symbolic register."'19
This assertion not only
highlights the fact that gender identification becomes eclipsed
by racial identification in the context of segregated bathroom
facilities, but also the fact that segregation and differentiation
is malleable and legally constructed.
The most obvious panacea is to create statutory
authority in which emphases of accommodation and equality
are moved to the forefront of lawmaking. This framework has
been employed in the context of disability antidiscrimination
protections. In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) passed mandating the retrofitting of public facilities,
including bathrooms. 20
Under the ADA, both newly
constructed and currently existing bathrooms needed to be
made available for persons with disabilities. The law suggests
that facility accommodations are necessary to remove the
"architectural barriers" for the disabled. 21
Prior to 1990, transgender individuals diagnosed with
GID could and did bring antidiscrimination lawsuits for
employers who failed to accommodate them. Ultimately, this
legal theory was no longer possible when Congress expressly
22
excluded transgender as a protected illness under the ADA.
The preclusion of transgender individuals from ADA coverage
proved to have practical and theoretical consequences. As a
practical matter, several transgender litigants were successful
with their disability discrimination claims. 23 As a theoretical
matter, a transgender seeking bathroom accommodations is
identical to a disabled person and less onerous architecturally.
18

Elizabeth Abel, Bathroom Doors and Drinking Fountains, 25

CRITICAL

INQUIRY 435 (2000).
19 Id. at 436.

42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1990).
22
See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (1990) (stating that "transvestism,
transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders" are not covered disabilities).
23 See, e.g., Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446, at *3
(D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
20
21
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Transgender individuals do not wish to create a separate
restroom facility for them, but rather they are hoping to use a
facility based on the gender to which they identify.
The legal regulation of restrooms emerged from an
ideology in which women who occupied public spaces needed
spatial safeguards. As women became more engaged in the
public sphere, particularly in the paid labor force, the
justification for sex-segregated bathrooms was premised on
women as "weaker" bodies who needed safe haven. 24 Even if
the "weaker bodies" argument had any merit, there still
remains the logistical question whether males and females
require separate facilities, particularly when bathrooms
already have architectural divisions within the space itself
(most notably, bathroom stalls). Indirectly, the ideological
context for separate facilities was only necessary to protect the
"separate spheres" social order in which males and females
occupied different spheres and performed different functions. 25
The normative problem of using a sex-laden framework
is that defining males and females based on biology will
marginalize some and privilege others such that it reinforces
gender norms. 26 In this case, transgender individuals either
face discrimination for not comporting with gender norms or
are compelled to produce medical documentation that shows an
official physical marker of moving from one gender group for
the other. Furthermore, this intrinsic division is based on
biological categories that are not necessarily visible 27 and
assumes that sex and gender are synonymous and
interchangeable.

24 See Kogan, supra note 3, at 27.
25 Id. at 34.
26 See generally JUDITH BUTLER,

GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINIsM

AND THE

SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (Lind J. Nicholson ed., Routledge Classics 2006)
(1990) (discussing how society constructs the norms associated with gender
and how this affects a person's behavior within these constructions).
27 See Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 40 (1995)
("Biology and genitals, so it seems, operate as false proxies for the real rules
of both gender attribution and sexual identity in our culture.").

2010

TRANSGENDER BATHROOM USE

III. CONCLUSION
At first blush, the issue of transgender bathroom usage
be
a seemingly isolated, unique, and extreme case. In the
may
context of antidiscrimination law, the absence of a statutory
solution to this concern, although professionally and socially
damaging for transgender employees, does not affect a
significant number of people to make this problem appear to be
However, the transgender restroom experience
pervasive.
exposes fundamental problems in gender jurisprudence.
Attention to transgender rights highlights broader
issues about how American jurisprudence places precedence on
race and disability in the context of bathroom integration and
accommodation, yet continues to use anatomy to justify
This
imposition of sex segregated bathroom facilities.
framework leads to a "privileging of biology and physical
difference." Such legal and social developments become further
complicated with a transgender whose identity challenges a
rigid gender binary through the transition from one gender to
the other. In addition, the transgender experience aids legal
theorists in trying to navigate the problem of identity
in
construction
its
in
the law and
construction
antidiscrimination and civil rights laws.2 8 The transgender
case prompts legal theorists and lawmakers to consider
deconstructing our current legal construction of difference to
fuel the ongoing progress of equality.

See Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom:A Challenge
for Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 31-32 (2003).
28

